Testimony, trust, and authority /
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| Author / Creator: | McMyler, Benjamin. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, c2011. |
| Description: | viii, 178 p. ; 25 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8509067 |
Table of Contents:
- 1. Testimony as a Philosophical Problem
- 1.1. Testimony, Knowledge, and Understanding
- 1.2. From Human Faith to Inductive Evidence
- 1.3. On Miracles: Hume Versus Port Royal
- 1.4. Inference, Perception, and Sociality: Hume Versus Reid
- 2. Knowing at Second Hand
- 2.1. What is Testimonial Knowledge?
- 2.2. Secondhandness and the Epistemic Right of Deferral
- 2.3. The Epistemological Problem of Testimony Revisited
- 2.4. An Argument from Secondhandness
- 2.5. Skepticism About Knowing at Second Hand
- 3. Three Models of Epistemic Dependence
- 3.1. The Evidential Model
- 3.2. The Inheritance Model
- 3.3. The Second-Personal Model
- 3.4. Moran on Assurance
- 3.5. Intermediate Cases and the Return of Epistemic Autonomy
- 4. Trusting a Person
- 4.1. The Grammar of Trust
- 4.2. Second-Personal Attitudes
- 4.3. Trust as Second-Personal
- 4.4. Trust as Cognitive
- 5. Authority, Autonomy, and Second-Personal Reasons
- 5.1. Second and Third-Personal Reasons
- 5.2. Second-Personal Reasons for Belief
- 5.3. Belief, Evidence, and Evidentialism
- 5.4. Theoretical Versus Practical Reasons
- 5.5. Conclusion: Authority, Sociality, and Cognition
