Review by Choice Review
In this excellent study based on more than 20 years of experience in Afghanistan, Suhrke (Chr. Michelson Institute, Norway) explores the reasons for the lackluster performance of the international intervention. While acknowledging that there was some progress, in particular in the health care, education, and rural development sectors, she points to the many problems that the mission has encountered since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. As the number of NATO and other military forces grew significantly over the following decade, violence increased and the insurgency expanded its reach as the governance was poor, corruption was pervasive, and economic development was uneven and shaky. This poor record, Suhrke argues, was not the result of a difficult context or insufficient resources, as most analysts argue. Rather the very nature of the international project, embedded in UN and other donors' ideas about the processes of state-building and peace-building, are directly implicated in this outcome. In particular, Suhrke argues, the poor performance of the international mission was the result of bias toward expanding the mission whenever problems emerged rather than rethinking the mission's goals, strategies, and agendas and considering alternative approaches. Summing Up: Highly recommended. General readers; upper-division undergraduates and above. A. Paczynska George Mason University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
