Rethinking the good : moral ideals and the nature of practical reasoning /

Rethinking the good : moral ideals and the nature of practical reasoning /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Temkin, Larry S.
Imprint:New York : Oxford University Press, 2011.
Description:xxi, 616 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Language:English
Series:Oxford ethics series
Oxford ethics series.
Subject:
Ethics.
Good and evil.
Practical reason.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8627938
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780199759446 (alk. paper)
0199759448 (alk. paper)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. Overview of the Book
  • 1.2. A Guide to the Material
  • 1.3. Intuitions
  • 1.4. Impossibility Arguments and Juggling
  • 1.5. Some Terminology
  • 1.6. Hammers and Nails
  • 1.7. Final Remarks
  • 2. Aggregation and Problems about Trade-offs: Many-Person Spectrum Arguments
  • 2.1. Aggregation: A General Schema
  • 2.2. Some Standard Views Regarding Trade-offs between Quality and Number
  • 2.3. The Problem of Additive Aggregation
  • 2.4. Jake Ross's Principle
  • 2.5. A Worry about Consistency
  • 2.6. Some Initial Worries and Preliminary Responses
  • 2.7. Extending the Results to Various Ideals
  • 2.8. Concluding Remarks
  • 3. A "New" Principle of Aggregation
  • 3.1. The Disperse Additional Burdens View
  • 3.2. The Disperse Additional Burdens View and the Levelling Down Objection
  • 3.3. Worries about Iteration
  • 3.4. The Bad Old Days and Harmless Torturers
  • 3.5. Anti-Additive-Aggregationist Principles, Prisoner's Dilemmas, and Each-We Dilemmas
  • 4. On the Separateness of Individuals, Compensation, and Aggregation within Lives
  • 4.1. On the Separateness of Individuals: Sidgwick, Rawls, and Nozick
  • 4.2. Compensation versus Moral Balancing
  • 4.3. Compensation, Prudential Balancing, and Additivity
  • 5. Aggregation and Problems about Trade-offs within Lives: Single-Person Spectrum Arguments
  • 5.1. The Third Standard View
  • 5.2. Another Worry about Consistency
  • 5.3. A Powerful Example: From Torture to Mosquito Bites
  • 5.4. Refining Views One through Four and Clarifying the Example
  • 5.5. An Objection to View Three: Invoking Principles of Decomposition and Recombination
  • 5.6. A Proportionality Argument against View Three
  • 5.7. Trusting Our Intuitions Regarding Inordinate Lengths of Time
  • 6. Exploring Transitivity: Part I
  • 6.1. Transitive and Nontransitive Relations
  • 6.2. Incommensurability/Incomparability and Conditions Where Transitivity Either Fails to Apply or Fails
  • 6.3. Rough Comparability
  • 6.4. Rational Decision Making and the Nontransitivity of Not Worse Than
  • 6.5. Rational Preferences and the Money Pump
  • 6.6. The Importance of Global and Strategic Reasoning
  • 7. Exploring Transitivity: Part II
  • 7.1. The Nontransitivity of Permissibility
  • 7.2. The Nontransitivity of Moral Obligatoriness
  • 7.3. The Obligatoriness Relation and Another Possible Money Pump
  • 7.4. From Obligatoriness to Better Than: On the Right and the Good, and the Inheritability of Nontransitivity
  • 7.5. Defending the Transitivity of the Obligatoriness Relation: A Fine-Grained Solution
  • 7.6. "All-Things-Considered Better Than": The Underlying Conditions That Might Make It a Transitive or Nontransitive Relation
  • 7.7. Introducing the Internal Aspects and Essentially Comparative Views
  • 8. Expected Utility Theory/Expected Value Theory
  • 8.1. Clarifying My Target
  • 8.2. A Brief Characterization of Expected Utility Theory and Expected Value Theory
  • 8.3. On the Relation between Rough Comparability and Expected Value Theory
  • 8.4. The Principle of Continuity
  • 8.4.1. Examining Continuity: "Easy" Cases versus "Extreme" Cases
  • 8.4.2. From Safe Bets to High-Stakes Bets: The Challenge
  • 8.4.3. Objections and Responses
  • 8.4.4. J. Ross's Principle Revisited
  • 8.5. Concluding Remarks
  • 9. Spectrum Arguments: Objections and Replies
  • 9.1. Different Kinds, Different Criteria
  • 9.2. Sorites Paradoxes
  • 9.2.1. The Purported Analogy
  • 9.2.2. Disanalogies
  • 9.2.3. Nonnormative Spectrum Arguments
  • 9.3. Heuristics and Similarity-Based Arguments
  • 10. On the Value of Utility and Two Models for Combining Ideals
  • 10.1. Preliminary Remarks
  • 10.2. A Standard Model for Utility and a Standard Model for Combining Ideals
  • 10.3. Is All Utility Noninstrumentally or Intrinsically Valuable?
  • 10.4. Total versus Average Utility
  • 10.5. Revisiting the Repugnant Conclusion
  • 10.6. The Capped Model for Ideals
  • 10.7. Upper and Lower Limits for Different Kinds of Utility
  • 10.8. Complications to Consider for a Capped Model of Utility
  • 10.9. Contrasting the Capped Model with the Standard Model for Utility
  • 10.10. Shared Formal or Structural Features of Ideals
  • 10.11. Concluding Remark
  • 11. On the Nature of Moral Ideals: Part I
  • 11.1. The Mere Addition Paradox
  • 11.2. Illuminating the Mere Addition Paradox: Parfit's Implicit Appeal to an Essentially Comparative View of Moral Ideals
  • 11.3. The Internal Aspects View of Moral Ideals
  • 11.4. An Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Principle
  • 11.5. On the Relevance of Mere Addition
  • 11.6. Reconsidering the Mere Addition Paradox on the Internal Aspects View
  • 11.7. Is the Mere Addition Paradox Genuinely Paradoxical?
  • 12. On the Nature of Moral Ideals: Part II
  • 12.1. Reconsidering the Essentially Comparative View
  • 12.2. Narrow Person-Affecting Views
  • 12.3. The Narrow Person-Affecting View: Objections and Responses
  • 12.4. Impersonal Views versus Person-Affecting Views: More Examples Illuminating the Powerful Appeal of Narrow Person-Affecting Considerations
  • 12.5. Restricting the Scope of Essentially Comparative Ideals
  • 12.6. Another Reason to Accept Essentially Comparative Views: Revisiting "How More Than France Exists"
  • 12.7. Two Further Reasons to Accept an Essentially Comparative View
  • 13. Juggling to Preserve Transitivity
  • 13.1. Fine-Grained Solutions
  • 13.2. The Time Trade-off Method
  • 13.3. A Sports Analogy
  • 13.4. Reflective Equilibrium
  • 13.5. Another Impossibility Result
  • 14. Conclusion
  • 14.1. Topics Canvassed
  • 14.2. Lessons Learned
  • 14.3. Work Remaining
  • 14.4. On the (Ir)Relevance of Meaning or Logic to Whether "All-Things-Considered Better Than" Is a Transitive Relation
  • 14.5. Some Responses to My Views
  • 14.6. On the Appropriateness of (Sometimes) Embracing Incredible or Inconsistent Views
  • 14.7. Moral and Practical Dilemmas
  • 14.8. Skepticism
  • 14.9. Final Remarks
  • Appendices
  • A. Worries about Duration and Number
  • B. On the Relations between Quantity, Quality, Duration, and Number
  • C. A New Version of the Paradox of the Heap
  • D. Three Further Objections to Spectrum Arguments
  • D.1. Vagueness and Indeterminacy
  • D.2. Zeno's Paradox
  • D.3. Finding a Uniquely Best Alternative along a Spectrum
  • E. Norcross's Argument for Restricting the Scope of the Narrow Person-Affecting View
  • F. Lexical Priority in Defense of the Axiom of Transitivity
  • G. Book Summary
  • G.1. Chapter 1
  • G.2. Chapter 2
  • G.3. Chapter 3
  • G.4. Chapter 4
  • G.5. Chapter 5
  • G.6. Chapter 6
  • G.7. Chapter 7
  • G.8. Chapter 8
  • G.9. Chapter 9
  • G.10. Chapter 10
  • G.11. Chapter 11
  • G.12. Chapter 12
  • G.13. Chapter 13
  • G.14. Chapter 14
  • G.16. Appendices
  • Bibliography
  • Index
  • List of Diagrams
  • List of Cases and Examples
  • List of Principles and Views
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