The intentional stance /

Contains ten papers that detail an analysis of intentionality; six essays have appeared elsewhere. Of the remaining four, two are relatively brief (introductory remarks and a concluding survey of leading views on attributions of intentionality) and two are substantive. Of the new pieces, the most important is ``True Believers,'' with which Dennett (Tufts) supplants ``Intentional Systems'' (1971) ``as the flagship expression'' of his account of intentionality. Though widely read and discussed, the six previously published papers have been scattered in professional journals and anthologies. They are usefully collected together in the present volume, and, with the new material, constitute an extended discussion of the main issues in the theory of content. Since the appearance of Content and Consciousness (1969), Dennett's views have evolved without significant doctrinal deviation. He urges that any system toward which we can adopt an intentional stance will count as a system with beliefs: an intentional system is a system whose behavior can be explained and predicted by attributing beliefs and desires to it. This view has come under attack for many different reasons, and The Intentional Stance contains Dennett's often cogent responses to his critics-advancing the debate on the nature of intentionality. Given its scope, ingenuity, and vivacity, it is an important work in the field that should be available in all libraries with undergraduate programs in philosophy, psychology, or cognitive science.-C.J. Shields, Colby College