Seven puzzles of thought and how to solve them : an originalist theory of concepts /

Seven puzzles of thought and how to solve them : an originalist theory of concepts /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Sainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark)
Imprint:	Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2012.
Description:	x, 194 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language:	English
Subject:	Thought and thinking. Concepts. Concepts. Thought and thinking.
Format:	E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8775009

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:	Seven puzzles of thought
Other authors / contributors:	Tye, Michael.
ISBN:	9780199695317 0199695318
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (p. [183]-187) and index. Also available on the Internet.
Summary:	"How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? R.M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye provide an entirely new theory--called "originalism"-- which provides simple and natural solutions to these puzzles and more. Originalism's central thesis is that concepts, the constituents of thoughts, are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. The doctrine has further valuable consequences for the nature of thought, our knowledge of our own thoughts, the nature of experience, the epistemology of perception-based beliefs, and for arguments based on conceivability. Sainsbury and Tye argue that although thought is special, there is no special mystery attaching to the nature of thought. Their account of the mind considers it as part of nature, as opposed to something with supernatural powers--which means that human beings have more opportunities to make mistakes than many have liked to think."--Dust jacket. Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically.

Table of Contents:

Preface
1. The Puzzles
2. Roads not Taken
3. Overview of an Originalist Theory of Concepts
4. The Originalist Theory Defended and Elaborated
5. Concept Externalism, Originalism and Privileged Access
6. The Metaphysics of Thought
7. The Puzzles Solved
8. Further Applications: Originalism and Experience
9. Objections and Replies
References
Index