In praise of reason /

In order to settle a dispute, one needs to settle the facts; to do this, one needs to settle how facts are to be known. But settling how facts are to be known is no easy task. Some would nominate reason as the most reliable guide, but how is one to justify this choice? Appealing to reason would only beg the question. To skirt this skeptical challenge, Lynch (Univ. of Connecticut) advances a pragmatic defense of reason, arguing that a set of shared epistemic principles is indispensable to civil society. To this end, he sets up a thought experiment in which agents are invited to select principles from behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance." Beginning in such an "epistemic original position," one's best bet would be to privilege principles that are "open" and can be appreciated from a "common point of view." And this, according to Lynch, is precisely why one should privilege the principles of science, with its practices that are repeatable, intersubjective, and transparent. Readers must decide whether Lynch's argument is compelling. Indisputable, however, is its novelty. Ultimately, Lynch may well be right: his may be the best, if not the only answer to the skeptic's challenge. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through faculty/researchers. F. A. Grabowski Rogers State University