The reference book /

The reference book /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hawthorne, John (John P.)
Edition:1st ed.
Imprint:Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012.
Description:vi, 264 p. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Reference (Philosophy)
Reference (Philosophy)
Format: E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8779193
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Manley, David (David Jeffrey)
ISBN:9780199693672 (hardback)
0199693676 (hardback)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (p. [249]-258) and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgments
  • Part I. Against acquaintance
  • 1. Introduction: reference and singular thought
  • 1.1. Preliminaries
  • 1.2. Themes from Russell
  • 1.3. Reference after Russell
  • 1.4. Singular thought after Russell
  • 1.5. Acquaintance after Russell
  • 1.6. Should auld acquaintance be forgot?
  • 1.7. Gameplan
  • 2. A defense of liberalism
  • 2.1. The spy argument
  • 2.2. Acquaintance and attitude reports
  • 2.3. Turning the tables
  • 2.4. Harmony, Sufficiency, and impoverished cases
  • 2.5. 'Believing ofÆ
  • 2.6. The Neptune argument
  • 2.7. The irrelevance of Constraint
  • 2.8. Sources of confusion
  • 2.9. Conditional reference fixers
  • 3. Epistemic acquaintance
  • 3.1. Knowing-which and discrimination
  • 3.2. Evans on acquaintance
  • 3.3. Objections
  • 3.4. Knowledge of existence
  • 3.5. Understanding and knowledge
  • Part II. Beyond acquaintance
  • 4. From the specific to the singular
  • 4.1. Indefinites: preliminary observations
  • 4.2. Specificity: the bifurcated view
  • 4.3. Interlude: presupposition
  • 4.4. Specificity: the simple view
  • 4.5. Interlude: covert domain restriction
  • 4.6. Specificity as domain restriction
  • 4.7. Singular restrictors
  • 4.8. Acquaintance again
  • 4.9. Coy and candid restrictions
  • 4.10. Variant views
  • 4.11. Specifics in attitude ascriptions
  • 4.12. The representation requirement
  • 5. What 'the'?
  • 5.1. Three approaches to uniqueness
  • 5.2. Existentialism
  • 5.3. Exceptions to specificity?
  • 5.4. Russellianism
  • 5.5. Neo-Fregeanism
  • 5.6. Three arguments for a neo-Fregean 'the'
  • 5.7. Five arguments against a neo-Fregean 'the'
  • 5.8. The upshot
  • 6. Et tu, 'Brute'?
  • 6.1. Demonstratives
  • 6.2. Non-rigid uses
  • 6.3. Salience
  • 6.4. Modal themes
  • 6.5. The view so far
  • 6.6. Names
  • 6.7. The predicate view: details
  • 6.8. Two ineffective arguments
  • 6.9. Calling and describing
  • 6.10. Against the predicate view
  • 6.11. Bare and bound?
  • 6.12. Varieties of validity
  • 6.13. Names: a tentative verdict
  • Afterword
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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