Scientific progress : a study concerning the nature of the relation between successive scientific theories /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Dilworth, Craig.
Imprint:	Dordrecht : Springer Verlag, 2007.
Description:	1 online resource (xvii, 289 p.)
Language:	English
Series:	Synthese library ; 153 Synthese library ; 153.
Subject:	Science -- Philosophy. Science -- Methodology. Science -- Methodology. Science -- Philosophy.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8883037

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ISBN:	9781402063541 1402063547 9781402063534 1402063539 661133923X 9786611339234
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (p. [267]-281) and index. Description based on print version record.
Summary:	"Kuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution." "In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth's Perspectivist conception of science does both." "While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations."--Jacket.
Other form:	Print version: Dilworth, Craig. Scientific progress. Dordrecht : Springer Verlag, 2007 9781402063534 1402063539

Table of Contents:

The decuctive model
The basis of the logical empiricist conception of science
The basis of the popperian conception of science
The logical empiricist conception of scientific progress
The Popperian conception of scientific progress
Popper, Lakatos, and the transcendence of the deductive model
Kuhn, Feyerabend, and incommensurability
The gestalt model
The perspectivist conception of science
Development of the perspectivist conception in the context of the kinetic theory of gases
The set-theoretic conception of science
Application of the perspectivist conception to the views of Newton, Kepler and Galileo.

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