Abortion and the moral significance of merely possible persons : finding middle ground in hard cases /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Roberts, Melinda A., 1954-
Imprint:Heidelberg ; New York : Springer Verlag, 2010.
Description:1 online resource (viii, 189 p.) : ill.
Language:English
Series:Philosophy and medicine ; v. 107
Philosophy and medicine ; v. 107.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8894764
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9789048137923
9048137926
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:"This book has two main goals. The first is to give an account, called Variablism, of the moral significance of merely possible persons -- persons who, relative to a particular circumstance, or possible future or world, could but in fact never do exist. The second is to use Variablism to illuminate abortion. ... Variablism supports the argument that the early abortion is ordinarily permissible when it is what the woman wants. ... In contrast, the late abortion is ordinarily subject to a different analysis. For the loss incurred in that case has full moral significance, according to Variablism, since it is incurred at a world where the person who incurs it does or will exist."--P. [4] of cover.
Other form:Print version: Roberts, Melinda A., 1954- Abortion and the moral significance of merely possible persons. Heidelberg ; New York : Springer Verlag, 2010 9789048137916 9048137918
Description
Summary:1.1 Goals 1.1.1 I have two main goals in this book. The first is to give an account of the moral significance of merely possible persons - persons who, relative to a particular 1 circumstance, or possible future or world, could but in fact never do exist. I call that account Variabilism. My second goal is to use Variabilism to begin to address the problem of abortion. 1.1.2 We ought to do the best we can for people. And we consider this obligation to extend to people who are, relative to a world, existing or future. But does it extend to merely possible people as well? And, if it does, then does it extend to making things better for them by way of bringing them into existence? If we say that surely it doesn't, does that then mean that our obligation to do the best we can for people does not, after all, extend to the merely possible - that the merely p- sible do not matter morally? But if the merely possible do not matter morally, then doesn't that mean that it would be permissible for us to bring them into miserable existences - and even obligatory to do just that - in the case where bringing the merely possible into miserable existences creates additional wellbeing for existing 1 References to merely possible persons and, later on, to persons who do exist - existing persons
Physical Description:1 online resource (viii, 189 p.) : ill.
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9789048137923
9048137926