The scope of autonomy : Kant and the morality of freedom /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Deligiorgi, Katerina, 1965-
Edition:	1st ed.
Imprint:	Oxford, U.K. : Oxford University Press, 2012.
Description:	xiv, 233 p. ; 23 cm.
Language:	English
Subject:	Kant, Immanuel, -- 1724-1804. Kant, Immanuel, -- 1724-1804 Kant, Immanuel, -- 1724-1804. Autonomy (Philosophy) Philosophy, Modern. Autonomy (Philosophy) Philosophy, Modern.
Format:	Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8901945

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ISBN:	9780199646159 0199646155
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (p. 211-227) and index.
Summary:	"Katerina Deligiorgi offers a contemporary defense of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. The theory defended in The Scope of Autonomy is distinctive in two respects. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, Deligiorgi shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one's higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy lying at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Proving this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is therefore essential: Deligiorgi shows that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive."--Publisher's website.

Table of Contents:

List of Abbreviations
1. Introduction. Autonomy: Specification of a Term, Recognition of a Problem
1.1. Kantian autonomy as co-legislation: a preliminary characterization
1.2. The many faces of Kantian autonomy
1.3. Nomos: the bond of freedom and the scope of autonomy
2. Moral Knowledge: Pure Reason and the Law
2.1. Kantian moral cognitivism: motivation for a defence
2.2. Universalizability: A test for moral truths without moral facts
2.3. Moral experience: the epistemic value of ordinary moral concepts
2.4. Practical reason and apriority
3. Moral Action: Motivation, Normativity, and Autonomous Willing
3.1. Kant, reasons for action, and acting for a reason
3.2. Reason in action: the psychological interpretation
3.3. The metaphysics of agency: obligatoriness, inescapability, necessitation
3.4. A cumulative argument: doxastic relevance and practical freedom
3.5. Back to the everyday: motives, norms, and the ends of reason
4. Freedom as Constraint: The Morality of Autonomy
4.1. Subject to the law: difficulties with autonomy
4.2. Practical identity, practical context, and the moral point of view
4.3. Apriority, 'the dear selfÆ, and moral possibility
5. Knowing Hearts: Emotion, Value, and Judgement
5.1. Why emotions matter: Kantian austerity on trial
5.2. Three Schillerian moral emotions and some contemporary rejoinders
5.3. Autonomy and moral life: Kantian responses
6. The Scope of Autonomy: Agency, Freedom, and Morality
6.1. Authenticity, integrity, independence, freedom
6.2. A Hegelian path to worldly agency and some obstacles
6.3. The Kantian alternative: freedom and the 'causality of reason'
6.4. Optimists and pessimists: context, practice, and the limits of theory
Bibliography
Index

The scope of autonomy : Kant and the morality of freedom /

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