Instrument choice is instrument design /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Weisbach, David A., author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2009.
Description:1 online resource (58 pages).
Language:English
Series:John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ; no. 490 (2d ser.)
John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ; 2nd ser., no. 490.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8936329
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Notes:"October 2009."
Title from online title page (viewed November 28, 2012).
Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:"This paper analyzes the choice between taxes and cap and trade systems (also referred to here as a permit system or a quantity restriction) as methods of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. It argues that in the domestic context, with proper design, the two instruments are essentially the same. Commonly discussed differences in the two instruments are due to unjustified assumptions about design. In the climate change context and within a single country there is sufficient design flexibility that these differences can be substantially eliminated. To the extent that there are remaining differences, there should be a modest preference for taxes, but the benefits of taxes are swamped by the benefits of good design; even though the very best tax might be better than the very best quantity restriction, the first order of business is getting the design right. In the international context, however, taxes dominate more strongly. The design flexibility available within a single country is reduced in the international context because of the problems of coordinating systems across countries and minimizing holdouts. Moreover, the incentives to cheat and the effects of cheating are not equivalent for the two instruments in the international setting. Because climate change will require a global system for emissions, these considerations mean we should favor taxes for controlling greenhouse gas emissions."

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000 i 4500
001 8936329
003 ICU
005 20190123103253.0
006 m o d
007 cr b||||||||||
008 121128s2009 ilu ob 000 0 eng c
040 |a CGU  |b eng  |e rda  |c CGU  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCA  |d OCLCF  |d CGU 
035 |a (OCoLC)819572374 
042 |a pcc 
050 4 |a K3593  |b .W45 2009 
049 |a CGUA 
100 1 |a Weisbach, David A.,  |e author.  |1 http://isni.org/isni/0000000083364598  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no99073895  |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/119925683 
245 1 0 |a Instrument choice is instrument design /  |c David A. Weisbach. 
264 1 |a [Chicago, Illinois] :  |b Law School, University of Chicago,  |c 2009. 
300 |a 1 online resource (58 pages). 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/contentTypes/txt 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/mediaTypes/c 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/carriers/cr 
490 1 |a John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ;  |v no. 490 (2d ser.) 
500 |a "October 2009." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
520 |a "This paper analyzes the choice between taxes and cap and trade systems (also referred to here as a permit system or a quantity restriction) as methods of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. It argues that in the domestic context, with proper design, the two instruments are essentially the same. Commonly discussed differences in the two instruments are due to unjustified assumptions about design. In the climate change context and within a single country there is sufficient design flexibility that these differences can be substantially eliminated. To the extent that there are remaining differences, there should be a modest preference for taxes, but the benefits of taxes are swamped by the benefits of good design; even though the very best tax might be better than the very best quantity restriction, the first order of business is getting the design right. In the international context, however, taxes dominate more strongly. The design flexibility available within a single country is reduced in the international context because of the problems of coordinating systems across countries and minimizing holdouts. Moreover, the incentives to cheat and the effects of cheating are not equivalent for the two instruments in the international setting. Because climate change will require a global system for emissions, these considerations mean we should favor taxes for controlling greenhouse gas emissions." 
500 |a Title from online title page (viewed November 28, 2012). 
650 0 |a Greenhouse gas mitigation  |x Law and legislation.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2007003434 
650 0 |a Emissions trading  |x Law and legislation.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh92006050 
650 0 |a Air  |x Pollution  |x Taxation. 
650 0 |a Environmental impact charges.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004467 
650 7 |a Air  |x Pollution  |x Taxation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00802175 
650 7 |a Emissions trading  |x Law and legislation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00908776 
650 7 |a Environmental impact charges.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00913081 
650 7 |a Greenhouse gas mitigation  |x Law and legislation.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01766067 
830 0 |a John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ;  |v 2nd ser., no. 490. 
856 4 0 |u http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/490-daw-instrument.pdf 
856 4 0 |u http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1493312 
903 |a HeVa 
929 |a cat 
999 f f |i eddfde58-52ae-5bec-97db-02fd5234c09e  |s 8077810d-ec90-5121-b2cc-ae9f4e15d64f 
928 |t Library of Congress classification  |a XXK3593.W45 2009  |l Online  |c UC-FullText  |u http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1493312  |g ebooks  |i 6735246 
928 |t Library of Congress classification  |a XXK3593.W45 2009  |l Online  |c UC-FullText  |u http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/490-daw-instrument.pdf  |g ebooks  |i 6823583