Instrument choice is instrument design /
Saved in:
Author / Creator: | Weisbach, David A., author. |
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Imprint: | [Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2009. |
Description: | 1 online resource (58 pages). |
Language: | English |
Series: | John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ; no. 490 (2d ser.) John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ; 2nd ser., no. 490. |
Subject: | |
Format: | E-Resource Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8936329 |
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100 | 1 | |a Weisbach, David A., |e author. |1 http://isni.org/isni/0000000083364598 |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no99073895 |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/119925683 | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Instrument choice is instrument design / |c David A. Weisbach. |
264 | 1 | |a [Chicago, Illinois] : |b Law School, University of Chicago, |c 2009. | |
300 | |a 1 online resource (58 pages). | ||
336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/contentTypes/txt | ||
337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/mediaTypes/c | ||
338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/carriers/cr | ||
490 | 1 | |a John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ; |v no. 490 (2d ser.) | |
500 | |a "October 2009." | ||
504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
520 | |a "This paper analyzes the choice between taxes and cap and trade systems (also referred to here as a permit system or a quantity restriction) as methods of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. It argues that in the domestic context, with proper design, the two instruments are essentially the same. Commonly discussed differences in the two instruments are due to unjustified assumptions about design. In the climate change context and within a single country there is sufficient design flexibility that these differences can be substantially eliminated. To the extent that there are remaining differences, there should be a modest preference for taxes, but the benefits of taxes are swamped by the benefits of good design; even though the very best tax might be better than the very best quantity restriction, the first order of business is getting the design right. In the international context, however, taxes dominate more strongly. The design flexibility available within a single country is reduced in the international context because of the problems of coordinating systems across countries and minimizing holdouts. Moreover, the incentives to cheat and the effects of cheating are not equivalent for the two instruments in the international setting. Because climate change will require a global system for emissions, these considerations mean we should favor taxes for controlling greenhouse gas emissions." | ||
500 | |a Title from online title page (viewed November 28, 2012). | ||
650 | 0 | |a Greenhouse gas mitigation |x Law and legislation. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2007003434 | |
650 | 0 | |a Emissions trading |x Law and legislation. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh92006050 | |
650 | 0 | |a Air |x Pollution |x Taxation. | |
650 | 0 | |a Environmental impact charges. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004467 | |
650 | 7 | |a Air |x Pollution |x Taxation. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00802175 | |
650 | 7 | |a Emissions trading |x Law and legislation. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00908776 | |
650 | 7 | |a Environmental impact charges. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00913081 | |
650 | 7 | |a Greenhouse gas mitigation |x Law and legislation. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01766067 | |
830 | 0 | |a John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ; |v 2nd ser., no. 490. | |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/490-daw-instrument.pdf |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1493312 |
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928 | |t Library of Congress classification |a XXK3593.W45 2009 |l Online |c UC-FullText |u http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/490-daw-instrument.pdf |g ebooks |i 6823583 |