Bitter victory : the battle for Sicily, 1943 /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:D'Este, Carlo, 1936-
Edition:1st American ed.
Imprint:New York : E.P. Dutton, c1988.
Description:666 p., [16] p. of plates : ill., ports. ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/894955
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0525244719 : $27.50
Notes:Includes index.
Bibliography: p. 635-641.
Review by Booklist Review

This detailed account of the Sicilian campaign in 1943 is comprehensive and extremely well done. D'Este has assembled an enormous amount of research from both primary and secondary sources, offering a clear account of a campaign bedeviled by Anglo-American disagreements both in the planning and the execution. He has also penned memorable portraits of many of the commanders (including Alexander, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, and Bradley). A major contribution to World War II history. Sources; to be indexed. RG. 940 World War, 1939-1945-Sicily [OCLC] 87-20094

From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

With a veritable blizzard of primary-source support, D'Este ( Decision in Normandy ) argues that the generally ignored Sicily campaign laid the foundation and set the trends for the decisive battles that were to follow in Italy and Northwest Europe. Sicily brought together the military commanders whose leadership ultimately decided the outcome of the war (Eisenhower, Tedder, Montgomery, Bradley, Patton); comprised the first real test of the military compatibility of the British and Americans; and served as a proving ground where the U.S. Army came into its own. D'Este is critical of the committee system of coalition warfare during this formative stage of the Allied partnership, citing the lack of strategic purpose in the campaign, the failure of Allied naval and air support, and the squandered opportunities that allowed the grossly outnumbered German army to pull off ``one of the most dazzling strategic withdrawals in military history.'' The Germans, according to D'Este, came away from Sicily convinced that they had given as good as they got. Illustrations. History Book Club alternate. (August) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Review by Kirkus Book Review

An evenhanded, meticulously documented, and consistently absorbing audit of the celebrated but seldom examined conquest of Sicily during WW II. D'Este (Decision in Normandy, 1983) reviews the conflicts between Allied leaders, which resulted in ad-hoc decisions and, inevitably, tactical blunders by field commanders. As a practical matter, the first large-scale amphibious assault on Axis territory soon became an exercise in overkill. With a break in the weather, a great US/UK armada was able to launch a successful invasion on the morning of July 10, 1943. Less fortunate, however, were many of the glider-borne and parachute troops dropped helter-skelter the previous night to disrupt communications and occupy inland airfields. In the event, Italian defenders offered only token resistance, but German forces fought well, counterattacking aggressively. After quickly capturing Syracuse, Montgomery's 8th Army stalled on the Catania plain. In the meantime, Patton (unfettered by a strategic plan) split his 7th Army, dispatching one part to Palermo and sending the other racing up the island's center. American and British forces did not link up until July 30, by which time the Germans had begun an effective delaying action, using Mount Etna as a shield. The Allies took Messina on August 30, and Sicily was theirs. The triumph was appreciably less decisive than it might have been because Kesselring beat a strategic retreat in the wake of Mussolini's forced resignation on July 26. In a Dunkirk-like evacuation, over 100,000 German and Italian troops were ferried to mainland Italy with most of their equipment to fight on other days. D'Este provides a panoramic overview of the Sicily campaign that includes a wealth of intriguing detail as well as big-picture perspectives. By way of example, he offers a persuasive reappraisal of Sir Harold Alexander as an overrated military commander, an unsparing account of Patton's abuse of shell-shocked GIs, interpretations of casualty data, an inquiry into the US Navy's recruitment of mafiosi like Lucky Luciano, and a reprise of Operation Mincemeat (immortalized in Ewen Montagu's The Man Who Never Was). The vivid text includes illuminating footnotes and a comprehensive bibliography, plus 12 pages of photos and a dozen maps (not seen). Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Review by Booklist Review


Review by Publisher's Weekly Review


Review by Kirkus Book Review