Review by Choice Review
In this lucid and closely argued book Tye works out a novel extension of the adverbial theory of sensory experience that eschews the metaphysical existence of mental events and mental objects, visual sensations, phenomenal properties, and mental representations. While preserving the substance of an adverbial account of sensory experience, Tye argues that sensory adverbs are analyzable as "predicate operators," each signifying functions that map predicate properties onto new properties. He calls his view an "operator theory" of mind to distinguish it from other versions of the adverbial theory (e.g., Wilfred Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, 1963, and R.M. Chisholm, Perceiving, 1957) which are "too restrictive," since not all of the predicate operators Tye introduces can be classified as adverbial. Tye's Theory is also different from versions that are "too general" (e.g., James Cornman, Materialism and Sensations, 1971), having only the repudiation of sense data in common with Tye's stance. What further distinguishes his operator theory from others is that Tye's theory encompasses propositional attitudes in addition to sensory experiences. The first chapter was cowritten with Terence Horgan; each chapter is well documented with citations to the most recent literature. This important contribution to the philosophy of mind is recommended for graduate students and advanced undergraduates. -S. M. Browne, Howard University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
