Review by Choice Review
Stromseth, an eminent expert on the debate over NATO strategy in the 1960s, presents an interesting volume at a time when the pending US Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty forces us to take a look at our nuclear strategy. Terms such as massive retaliation, nuclear deterrent, conventional defenses, and multilateral force are explained and examined in light of the projected Warsaw Pact action and reaction. In the 1960s President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara first proposed a more flexible response instead of immediate and heavy reliance on atomic weapons in the event of a Soviet attack; this provoked long and drawn-out discussions within the US and among the European allies, eventually resulting in a compromise in 1967, which Dennis Healy in his foreword calls inadequate and crying out for correction. For there to be correction, however, the motives and motivations leading to the agreement must be understood. Characterized by Healy as "a guidebook through the labyrinth of nuclear dilemmas," this work does its job admirably. For upper-division undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty. -W. S. G. Kohn, Illinois State University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
