From Whorf to Montague : explorations in the theory of language /
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Author / Creator: | Seuren, Pieter A. M. |
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Edition: | 1st ed. |
Imprint: | Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. |
Description: | xviii, 365 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
Language: | English |
Subject: | |
Format: | Print Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/9350918 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Abbreviations and symbols
- Introduction
- 1. The settling of a language
- 1.1. A language as part of social reality
- 1.2. Languages 'go their own way'
- 1.2.1. The arbitrary extension of semantic categories
- 1.2.2. Semantic bleaching
- 1.2.3. Auxiliation
- 1.2.4. Perfective auxiliaries: have or be
- 1.2.5. Subtle near-synonyms: use conditions versus truth conditions
- 1.3. Creolization: the case of Sranan
- 1.4. The heteromorphy problem
- 2. The Whorf hypothesis
- 2.1. Introduction
- 2.2. Some history
- 2.2.1. The Whorf hypothesis in North America
- 2.2.2. European 'Whorfianism': Leo Weisgerber
- 2.3. Whorf
- 2.3.1. The hypothesis analysed
- 2.3.2. The perennial problem: the direction of causality
- 2.3.3. Confusing the how and the what
- 2.3.4. The alleged primacy of language over cognition
- 2.3.5. Grammar as a formally definable system
- 2.3.6. Whorf's attitude towards mathematics and the sciences
- 2.3.7. Levels of thinking
- 2.3.8. Whorf's arguments: Hopi time and tense, Shawnee sentence types
- 2.3.9. Language expresses thought: arguments against Whorf
- 2.4. Experimental testing
- 2.4.1. Inconclusive experiments
- 2.4.1.1. Colour
- 2.4.1.2. Levinson and absolute orientation
- 2.4.2. Getting closer
- 2.4.2.1. Bowerman and Choi (2003)
- 2.4.2.2. Which way does time fly?
- 2.4.2.3. Handedness
- 2.4.2.4. Length versus quantity in time measurement expressions
- 2.5. Conclusion
- 3. Relativism or a universal theory?
- 3.1. Some necessary preliminaries
- 3.1.1. A terminological observation
- 3.1.2. Some observations regarding scientific methodology
- 3.2. Some history
- 3.3. Attitudes
- 3.4. Further notional clarity
- 3.5. What are 'universals of language'?
- 3.6. What to do with counterevidence?
- 3.7. Modularity, innateness, and the 'no negative evidence' problem
- 3.7.1. Modularity and innateness
- 3.7.2. The 'no negative evidence' problem
- 3.7.2.1. Internal anaphora resolution of definite terms
- 3.7.2.2. Internal versus external datives
- 3.7.2.3. English zero-causatives and un-verbs: a universal theory of the lexicon?
- 3.8. Towards a general theory of human language
- 3.8.1. A few proposals for universal properties of languages and grammars
- 3.8.2. How about constituent structure?
- 3.9. Conclusion
- 4. What does language have to do with logic and mathematics?
- 4.1. Introduction
- 4.2. Language and logic
- 4.2.1. What is (a) logic?
- 4.2.2. The tradition
- 4.2.3. Syntax: the notion of a grammatical algorithm
- 4.2.4. Semantic syntax: propositions in logic, sentences in language
- 4.2.5. Semantics: model-theoretic semantic interpretation
- 4.3. Natural logic and natural set theory
- 4.4. The importance of scope relations
- 4.5. Conclusion
- 5. A test bed for grammatical theories
- 5.1. Introduction
- 5.2. Some class A facts
- 5.2.1. The epithet pronoun test
- 5.2.2. Topic-comment structure
- 5.2.2.1. Topic-comment structure and reflexivity
- 5.2.2.2. Topic-comment structure and anaphoric relations
- 5.2.2.3. Truth-conditional differences in topic-comment structures
- 5.2.3. Scope and negation
- 5.2.3.1. NEG-Raising
- 5.2.3.2. AUX-Inversion, yes or no?
- 5.3. Some class B facts
- 5.3.1. German and Dutch verb clustering
- 5.3.2. The inflected infinitive in Portuguese
- 5.4. Conclusion
- 6. The Chomsky hierarchy in perspective
- 6.1. Introduction
- 6.2. What is an algorithm and why is this notion relevant for the study of language?
- 6.3. The Chomsky hierarchy
- 6.3.1. The primitive generation of tree structures
- 6.3.2. Type-3 algorithms
- 6.3.2.1. Nth-order approximations
- 6.3.2.2. Entropy as a measure of meaningfulness
- 6.3.3. Context-free and context-sensitive grammars
- 6.4. The rise and fall, and then the rise again, of transformational grammar
- 6.5. Autonomous Syntax and the evolution of language
- 6.6. Conclusion
- 7. Reflexivity and identity in language and cognition
- 7.1. The overall programme
- 7.2. Semantic reflexivity
- 7.3. Why do we need the True Binarity Principle?
- 7.4. The predicate of identity, or rather, identification
- 7.5. Is identity-be a counterexample to TBP?
- 7.6. Dynamic sentence meaning: discourse incrementation
- 7.7. Conclusion
- 8. The generalized logic hierarchy and its cognitive implications
- 8.1. Introduction
- 8.2. The notion of valuation space
- 8.3. How to construct a VS-model for a logical system
- 8.4. Valuation spaces and polygons for other logical systems
- 8.4.1. Aristotelian-Abelardian predicate logic (AAPL)
- 8.4.2. 'Leaking' the O-corner
- 8.4.3. Basic-natural predicate logic (BNPL)
- 8.4.3.1. The inadequacy of the Gricean solution
- 8.4.3.2. The logical system of BNPL
- 8.4.3.3. Unilateral and bilateral some: some tentative thoughts
- 8.4.3.4. The presuppositional solution
- 8.5. The Blanché hexagon
- 8.5.1. The logical aspects
- 8.5.2. Applications to conceptual fields and colours
- 8.5.3. The bi-triadic nature of the Blanche hexagon and, who knows, of cognition
- 9. . The intensionalization of extensions
- 9.1. Introduction
- 9.2. Some basic notions
- 9.2.1. Language as a system of conventional signs: what is meaning?
- 9.2.2. Propositions, intents, and L-propositions
- 9.2.3. Semantic questionnaires
- 9.2.4. Grammar, meaning, and cognition
- 9.2.5. Virtual and actual facts
- 9.2.6. Truth conditions and use conditions: 'settling' phenomena
- 9.2.7. Comprehension is part of semantics; interpretation is not
- 9.2.8. Software realism and weak instrumentalism
- 9.2.9. Formal explicitation of natural cognitive systems
- 9.3. Critique of PWS
- 9.3.1. Foundations and methodology
- 9.3.2. Empirical inadequacy of PWS
- 9.3.3. Truth values as extensions and as Boolean 1 and 0
- 9.4. Intensions and the blocking of substitutivity
- 9.4.1. Frege's system of extensions and intensions
- 9.4.2. The cognitive view of intensions
- 9.5. The Kantian paradox of knowledge and virtual reality
- 9.6. The new game of extensions and intensions
- 9.7. The nature of facts
- 9.8. Valuation spaces
- 9.9. The truth predicates
- 9.10. SSV in partiscient contexts
- 9.10.1. Under surface predicates
- 9.10.2. Under truth predicates and prepositional operators
- 9.10.3. Under epistemic modals
- 9.10.4. Doubtful cases
- 9.10.5. No happy extensionalist problem
- 9.11. Quantification
- 9.12. Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index