Review by Choice Review
The thesis defended is that thinking is the deployment of a mental language--"Mentalese"--encoded in just the right kind of matter. Thinking is an inferential process and, like any such, must involve the transformation of symbols under the control of some kind of grammar. Hence, the need for a language in which the mind computes, "the deployment of a mental language." As a result of considerations about intentionality, Mentalese cannot be an uninterpreted language; it must have content. Nativism, the claim that the content must come with the creature, is rejected in favor of the view that sensation furnishes the content. But sensation appears to be a physical process possible in only certain kinds of physical structures involving a specific sort of biochemistry; that is, "just the right kind of matter." In stating and defending his thesis, Maloney devotes a chapter each to discussion of many of the important problems in cognitive science: the frame problem and scripts, the distinction between purposeful behavior and mere reaction, intentionality, sensation, and consciousness. Excellent references; useful index. A must volume for current undergraduate library collections in the philosophy of mind. -R. L. Greenwood, University of South Alabama
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
