Unbundling criminal trial rights /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Rappaport, John, 1980- author.
Imprint:	[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2014.
Description:	1 online resource (20 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 483 Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 483.
Subject:	Defense (Criminal procedure) -- United States. Pre-trial procedure -- United States. Plea bargaining -- United States. Sentences (Criminal procedure) -- United States. Defense (Criminal procedure) Plea bargaining. Pre-trial procedure. Sentences (Criminal procedure) United States.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10103361

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Notes:	"August 2014." Includes bibliographical references. Title from online title page (viewed December 2, 2014).
Summary:	"The notion that criminal defendants are put to an all-or-nothing choice between the guilty plea and full-blown jury trial is both pervasive and wrong. Defendants can, and sometimes do, 'unbundle' their jury-trial rights and trade them piecemeal, consenting to streamlined trial procedures to reduce their sentencing exposure. This Article explores what happens if, once and for all, we eschew the all-or-nothing framework and actually encourage these 'unbundled bargains.' The parties could then tailor court procedures by agreement. Defendants, for example, could bargain for sentencing leniency by consenting to a six-person jury. Or the parties could agree to submit a case to private arbitration. Would such a world be better or worse than the one we have now? This Article takes a first cut at this question, making the uneasy case that the benefits of unbundled bargaining plausibly outweigh the costs."

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