Campaign Finance Reform and Incentives to Voluntarily Limit Candidate Spending From Personal Funds Constitutional Issues Raised by Public Subsidies and Variable Contribution Limits.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Corporate author / creator:Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
Imprint:[S.l] : [s.n.], 2001.
Description:5 p. : digital, PDF file.
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource U.S. Federal Government Document Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10600584
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other uniform titles:ProQuest U.S. Congressional Research Digital Collection.
Notes:Record is based on bibliographic data in ProQuest U.S. Congressional Research Digital Collection (last viewed July 2010). Reuse except for individual research requires license from ProQuest, LLC.
CRS Report.
Summary:Provides overview of Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Valeo that spending limits, including the amount a candidate can spend on his or her own campaign from personal funds, are unconstitutional unless they are voluntarily accepted in exchange for some form of public financing. Discusses Constitutional issues raised by public subsidies and variable contribution limit incentives designed to increase voluntary compliance with a personal funds expenditure limit.
Other form:Microfiche version: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Campaign Finance Reform and Incentives to Voluntarily Limit Candidate Spending From Personal Funds