Inequality and the mortgage interest deduction /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Hemel, Daniel, author.
Imprint:	[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2016.
Description:	1 online resource (43 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 775 Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 593 Kreisman working paper on housing law and policy ; no. 39 Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 775. Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 593. Kreisman working paper on housing law and policy ; no. 39.
Subject:	Income tax deductions for interest -- United States. Tax deductions -- United States. Mortgages -- Taxation -- United States. Income distribution -- United States. Income distribution. Income tax deductions for interest. Mortgages -- Taxation. Tax deductions. United States.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10942387

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Rozema, Kyle, author.
Notes:	"August 2016." Includes bibliographical references. Title from online title page (viewed January 12, 2017).
Summary:	"The mortgage interest deduction is often criticized for contributing to after-tax income inequality. Yet the effects of the mortgage interest deduction on income inequality are more nuanced than the conventional wisdom would suggest. We show that the mortgage interest deduction causes high-income households (i.e., those in the top 10% and top 1%) to bear a larger share of the total tax burden than they would if the deduction were repealed. We further show that the effect of the mortgage interest deduction on income inequality is highly sensitive to the alternative scenario against which the deduction is evaluated. These findings demonstrate that claims about the distributional effects of the mortgage interest deduction depend critically on the counterfactual to which the status quo is compared. We extend our analysis to the deduction for state and local taxes and the charitable contribution deduction. We conclude that the appropriate counterfactual for distributional claims is dependent upon political context - and, in particular, on the feasible set of politically acceptable reforms up for consideration."

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