Germ gambits : the bioweapons dilemma, Iraq and beyond /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Smithson, Amy E.
Imprint:Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Security Studies, an Imprint of Stanford University Press, 2011.
Description:1 online resource (xiv, 368 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11119266
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780804780711
0804780714
9780804775526
9780804775533
0804775532
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
English.
Print version record.
Summary:Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq's Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy.
Other form:Print version: Smithson, Amy E. Germ gambits. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Security Studies, an Imprint of Stanford University Press, 2011