Hidden Bibliographic Details
| ISBN: | 1417519339
9781417519330
0791456250
9780791456255
0791456269
9780791456262
9780791487365
0791487369
9780791487365
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 137-144) and index.
English.
Print version record.
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| Summary: | Annotation Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use, " what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.
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| Other form: | Print version: Ellenbogen, Sara. Wittgenstein's account of truth. Albany : State University of New York Press, ©2003 0791456250 0791456269
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