Wasting a crisis : why securities regulation fails /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Mahoney, Paul G. (Paul Gerard), 1959- author.
Imprint:Chicago ; London : University of Chicago Press, 2015.
©2015
Description:1 online resource : illustrations
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11241208
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780226236650
022623665X
9780226236513
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Summary:This study argues that policy responses to financial crises are similar across time and place and are generally ineffective or counterproductive. Political actors, hoping to avoid blame for a financial crisis, create a 'market failure narrative' arguing that misbehaviour by securities market participants, rather than prior policy errors, was the primary cause of the crisis. Regulatory reforms are therefore designed to solve problems that are either non-existent or tangentially related to the crisis. The reforms often decrease competition and concentrate the market share of leading financial firms.
Other form:Print version: Mahoney, Paul G. (Paul Gerard), 1959- Wasting a crisis 9780226236513