Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN: | 9781441115041 1441115048 9780826496256 0826496253
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Digital file characteristics: | data file
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Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 122-151) and index. Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
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Summary: | Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free.€ Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will.€ According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does.€ On this view, free will centrally depends.
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Other form: | Print version: Timpe, Kevin. Free will. London ; New York : Continuum, ©2008 9780826496256
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