Friendly rivals : bargaining and burden-shifting in NATO /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Thies, Wallace J., author.
Imprint:London : Taylor and Francis Ltd, [2015]
Description:1 online resource
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11305117
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9781317470120
1317470125
9780765610164
0765610167
0765610175
9780765610171
Notes:Vendor-supplied metadata.
Summary:Viewing the behavior of NATO members through the prism of bargaining theory reveals them as states intent on obtaining the benefits of membership at the least cost to themselves. This book shows how NATO members use a variety of strategies and tactics to try to get the better of each other without wrecking an alliance that realizes their shared goals and from which they all benefit. The book examines: the original design of the alliance; patterns of bargaining during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods; how their rivalries impact members' domestic policies of defense and welfare; and what t.
Other form:Print version: Thies, Wallace J. Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO. Hoboken : Taylor and Francis, ©2015 9780765610164