| Summary: | "Examining the political foundations of American intelligence policy, this book develops a new theory of intelligence adaptation to explain the success or failure of major reform efforts since World War II. Durbin draws on careful case histories of the early Cold War, the Nixon and Ford administrations, the first decade after the Cold War, and the post-9/11 period, looking closely at the interactions among Congress, executive branch seniors, and intelligence officials. These cases demonstrate the significance of two factors in the success or failure of reform efforts: the level of foreign policy consensus in the system, and the ability of reformers to overcome the information advantages held by intelligence agencies. As these factors ebb and flow, windows of opportunity for reform open and close, and different actors and interests come to influence reform outcomes. Durbin concludes that the politics of US intelligence frequently inhibit effective adaptation, affecting America's security and the civil liberties of its citizens"--
""Please set this up confidentially..." On June 18, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt sat reading through a short memo submitted to him by Colonel William "Wild Bill" Donovan, a military hero of World War I who aspired to a senior position in Roosevelt's administration. It was a difficult time for the president, who had been struggling to placate an isolationist American public even as he saw the country stumbling toward war. American materiel was already being used by British forces on the battlegrounds of Europe; across the Pacific, US territories and allies were under threat from the Imperial Japanese Navy. Despite his campaign promise to America that "your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars," Roosevelt knew that soon the country would likely be sending its sons into the deadliest conflict in human history. He also knew that it was not ready for the fight"--
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