The CIA and the politics of US intelligence reform /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Durbin, Brent, author.
Imprint:Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017.
©2017
Description:viii, 330 pages ; 24 cm
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11339485
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:Central Intelligence Agency and the politics of United States intelligence reform
ISBN:9781107187405
1107187400
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:"Examining the political foundations of American intelligence policy, this book develops a new theory of intelligence adaptation to explain the success or failure of major reform efforts since World War II. Durbin draws on careful case histories of the early Cold War, the Nixon and Ford administrations, the first decade after the Cold War, and the post-9/11 period, looking closely at the interactions among Congress, executive branch seniors, and intelligence officials. These cases demonstrate the significance of two factors in the success or failure of reform efforts: the level of foreign policy consensus in the system, and the ability of reformers to overcome the information advantages held by intelligence agencies. As these factors ebb and flow, windows of opportunity for reform open and close, and different actors and interests come to influence reform outcomes. Durbin concludes that the politics of US intelligence frequently inhibit effective adaptation, affecting America's security and the civil liberties of its citizens"--
""Please set this up confidentially..." On June 18, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt sat reading through a short memo submitted to him by Colonel William "Wild Bill" Donovan, a military hero of World War I who aspired to a senior position in Roosevelt's administration. It was a difficult time for the president, who had been struggling to placate an isolationist American public even as he saw the country stumbling toward war. American materiel was already being used by British forces on the battlegrounds of Europe; across the Pacific, US territories and allies were under threat from the Imperial Japanese Navy. Despite his campaign promise to America that "your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars," Roosevelt knew that soon the country would likely be sending its sons into the deadliest conflict in human history. He also knew that it was not ready for the fight"--

MARC

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100 1 |a Durbin, Brent,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2017043320  |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/2150170450900010885 
245 1 4 |a The CIA and the politics of US intelligence reform /  |c Brent Durbin. 
246 3 |a Central Intelligence Agency and the politics of United States intelligence reform 
264 1 |a Cambridge, United Kingdom ;  |a New York, NY :  |b Cambridge University Press,  |c 2017. 
264 4 |c ©2017 
300 |a viii, 330 pages ;  |c 24 cm 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/contentTypes/txt 
337 |a unmediated  |b n  |2 rdamedia  |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/mediaTypes/n 
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504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
520 |a "Examining the political foundations of American intelligence policy, this book develops a new theory of intelligence adaptation to explain the success or failure of major reform efforts since World War II. Durbin draws on careful case histories of the early Cold War, the Nixon and Ford administrations, the first decade after the Cold War, and the post-9/11 period, looking closely at the interactions among Congress, executive branch seniors, and intelligence officials. These cases demonstrate the significance of two factors in the success or failure of reform efforts: the level of foreign policy consensus in the system, and the ability of reformers to overcome the information advantages held by intelligence agencies. As these factors ebb and flow, windows of opportunity for reform open and close, and different actors and interests come to influence reform outcomes. Durbin concludes that the politics of US intelligence frequently inhibit effective adaptation, affecting America's security and the civil liberties of its citizens"--  |c Provided by publisher. 
520 |a ""Please set this up confidentially..." On June 18, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt sat reading through a short memo submitted to him by Colonel William "Wild Bill" Donovan, a military hero of World War I who aspired to a senior position in Roosevelt's administration. It was a difficult time for the president, who had been struggling to placate an isolationist American public even as he saw the country stumbling toward war. American materiel was already being used by British forces on the battlegrounds of Europe; across the Pacific, US territories and allies were under threat from the Imperial Japanese Navy. Despite his campaign promise to America that "your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars," Roosevelt knew that soon the country would likely be sending its sons into the deadliest conflict in human history. He also knew that it was not ready for the fight"--  |c Provided by publisher. 
505 8 |a Machine generated contents note: 1. Politics, the CIA, and the pathology of intelligence reform; 2. Understanding intelligence reform; Part I. Adapting to the Early Cold War: 3. The founding of US Central Intelligence, 1941-1946; 4. US Intelligence and the early Cold War, 1947-1953; Part II. Adapting to the Collapse of the Cold War Consensus: 5. US Intelligence at the advent of detente, 1968-1974; 6. Politicizing US Intelligence, 1974-1978; Part III. Adapting to the End of the Cold War: 7. Intelligence for a New World Order, 1989-1992; 8. Scandal, study, and stasis, 1992-1996; Part IV. Adapting to the Post-9/11 Era: 9. Intelligence reform after 9/11, 2001-2004; 10. Intelligence in an age of terror, 2004-2015; 11. What have we learned? 
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