France's war in Mali : lessons for an expeditionary army /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Shurkin, Michael Robert, author.
Imprint:Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND Corporation, [2014]
©2014
Description:1 online resource (xiv, 51 pages) : color illustrations, color maps.
Language:English
Series:RAND Corporation research report series ; RR770
Research report (Rand Corporation) ; RR770.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11397319
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Other authors / contributors:Rand Corporation, publisher.
ISBN:9780833089502
0833089501
Digital file characteristics:text file PDF
Notes:"Prepared for the United States Army."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 47-51).
Online resource; title from PDF title page (RAND, viewed October 25, 2014).
Summary:In 2013, just as U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno was articulating a particular vision for expeditionary operations, the French Army was fielding a force in Mali that in many ways provided a real-world example of the kind of operations Odierno envisioned. France fielded a relatively small force put together using small, scalable combined arms taskorganized units as basic building blocks and conducted a campaign that emphasized speed and maneuver over force protection. The French force, moreover, is for all intents and purposes regionally aligned, and it demonstrated the benefits that could accrue through its apparently effective operations among and with local and regional actors. The French also have a force structure well suited to expeditionary operations in austere environments, as well as an expeditionary institutional culture.