Hidden Bibliographic Details
| ISBN: | 9780511424144
9780511510243
0511510241
0511424140
0521882354
9780521882354
0511423667
9780511423666
9786611775667
6611775668
9781107405240
1107405246
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 269-290) and index.
Print version record.
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| Summary: | China, like many authoritarian regimes, struggles with the tension between the need to foster economic development by empowering local officials and the regime's imperative to control them politically. Landry explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages local officials in order to meet these goals and perpetuate an unusually decentralized authoritarian regime. Using unique data collected at the municipal, county, and village level, Landry examines in detail how the promotion mechanisms for local cadres have allowed the CCP to reward officials for the development of their localities without weakening political control. His research shows that the CCP's personnel management system is a key factor in explaining China's enduring authoritarianism and proves convincingly that decentralization and authoritarianism can work hand in hand.
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| Other form: | Print version: Landry, Pierre F. (Pierre Francois), 1967- Decentralized authoritarianism in China. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008 9780521882354 0521882354
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