Fiscal surveillance in a petro zone : the case of the CEMAC /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Wiegand, Johannes.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Dept., 2004.
Description:1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/04/8
IMF working paper ; WP/04/8.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12495462
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund. Policy Development and Review Department.
ISBN:1281089699
9781281089694
9781451890723
1451890729
146235615X
9781462356157
1452762414
9781452762418
9786613775054
6613775053
9781451842548
1451842546
Digital file characteristics:text file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (page 25).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:This paper discusses fiscal surveillance criteria for the countries of the Central African Monetary and Economic Union (CEMAC), most of which depend heavily on oil exports. At present, the CEMAC's macroeconomic surveillance exercise sets as fiscal target a floor on the basic budgetary balance. This appears inadequate, for at least two reasons. First, fluctuations in oil prices and, hence, oil receipts obscure the underlying fiscal stance. Second, oil resources are limited, which suggests that some of today's oil receipts should be saved to finance future consumption. The paper develops easy-to-calculate indicators that take both aspects into account. A retrospective analysis based on these alternative indicators reveals that in recent years, the CEMAC's surveillance exercise has tended to accommodate stances of fiscal policy that are at odds with sound management of oil wealth.
Other form:Print version: Wiegand, Johannes. Fiscal surveillance in a petro zone. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Dept., 2004
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451890723.001