Can short-term capital controls promote capital inflows? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Cordella, Tito.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, ©1998.
Description:1 online resource (10 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/98/131
IMF working paper ; WP/98/131.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12495968
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Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department.
ISBN:1282050966
9781282050969
145190052X
9781451900521
1462346871
9781462346875
1452771413
9781452771410
9786613798411
661379841X
9781451855258
1451855257
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (page 10).
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Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
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Print version record.
Summary:Annotation In an economy la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises may increase the volume of capital inflows.
Other form:Print version: Cordella, Tito. Can short-term capital controls promote capital inflows? [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, ©1998
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451900521.001