Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | IMF Institute.
International Monetary Fund.
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| ISBN: | 1451896565
9781451896565
128137587X
9781281375872
1462334849
9781462334841
1452704856
9781452704852
9786613779557
6613779555
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 11-12).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | Annotation This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).
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| Other form: | Print version: Ley, Eduardo. Statistical inference as a bargaining game. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451896565.001
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