Central bank financial strength, transparency, and policy credibility /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Stella, Peter, 1957-
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002.
Description:1 online resource (42 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/02/137
IMF working paper ; WP/02/137.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496223
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Mansoor, Ali M.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department.
ISBN:1451901054
9781451901054
1462311555
9781462311552
1452779473
9781452779478
1282110969
9781282110960
9786613803849
6613803847
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 38-42).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:A central bank is financially strong if it possesses resources sufficient to attain its fundamental policy objective(s). Once endowed with those resources, relations between government and central bank should be designed so that significant changes in central bank financial strength do not occur unless necessitated by changes in policy objectives. The level of strength required depends on the array of policy objectives (for example, the exchange rate regime) as well as the constraints and risks presented by the operational environment. Attaining credibility is facilitated if the public can easily determine the financial strength of the bank, yet for a variety of reasons this is often difficult. Transparency requires institutional arrangements that ensure the central bank generates profit in most states of the world, is subject to strict ex post independent audit, and transfers regularly all profits, after provisions, to the treasury.
Other form:Print version: Stella, Peter, 1957- Central bank financial strength, transparency, and policy credibility. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451901054.001