Bailout and conglomeration /

Bailout and conglomeration /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Kim, Se-jik, 1960-
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Department, ©1999.
Description:	1 online resource (29 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/99/108 IMF working paper ; WP/99/108.
Subject:	Conglomerate corporations -- Finance -- Econometric models. Debt-to-equity ratio -- Econometric models. Liquidation -- Econometric models. Bank loans -- Econometric models. Bank loans -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496234

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:	145189869X 9781451898699 1452777489 9781452777481 1282111841 9781282111844 9786613804037 6613804037
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (page 29). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	The paper suggests that when firms differ stochastically in their productivity, a bank may find it optimal not to bail out the failed nonconglomerate firms at all, but to bail out conglomerates fully. Expectation of such bailout policy may encourage risk-averse firms to join a conglomerate to minimize the risk of liquidation. Furthermore, in case of private information, bad firms follow good firms' decision on conglomeration to hide their type. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of conglomeration on the debt-equity ratio and the expansion of existing conglomerates through mergers and acquisitions.
Other form:	Print version: Kim, Se-Jik, 1960- Bailout and conglomeration. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Department, ©1999
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451898699.001

Description
Summary:	The paper suggests that when firms differ stochastically in their productivity, a bank may find it optimal not to bail out the failed nonconglomerate firms at all, but to bail out conglomerates fully. Expectation of such bailout policy may encourage risk-averse firms to join a conglomerate to minimize the risk of liquidation. Furthermore, in case of private information, bad firms follow good firms' decision on conglomeration to hide their type. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of conglomeration on the debt-equity ratio and the expansion of existing conglomerates through mergers and acquisitions.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (29 pages)
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (page 29).
ISBN:	145189869X 9781451898699 1452777489 9781452777481 1282111841 9781282111844 9786613804037 6613804037
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;