Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
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| ISBN: | 1283515725
9781283515726
145191928X
9781451919288
1462350674
9781462350674
145272279X
9781452722795
9786613828170
6613828173
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 28-29).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.
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| Other form: | Print version: Baqir, Reza. Government spending, legislature size, and the executive veto. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451919288.001
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