Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
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| ISBN: | 1282456598
9781282456594
1451913532
9781451913538
9781451869002
1451869002
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 28-29).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | Delays in debt restructuring negotiations are widely regarded as inefficient. This paper argues that delays can allow the economy to recover from a crisis, make more resources available for debt settlement, and enable the negotiating parties to enjoy a larger "cake". Within this context, therefore, delays may be "beneficial". This paper explores this idea by constructing a dynamic model of sovereign default in which debt renegotiation is modeled as a stochastic bargaining game based on Merlo and Wilson's (1995) framework. Quantitative analysis shows that this model can generate an average delay length comparable to that experienced by Argentina in its most recent debt restructuring.
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| Other form: | Print version: Bi, Ran. "Beneficial" delays in debt restructuring negotiations. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., 2008
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451913538.001
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