Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund.
IMF Institute.
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| ISBN: | 1462350860
9781462350865
1452799628
9781452799629
1282108387
9781282108387
9786613801739
6613801739
9781451904383
145190438X
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-29).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | Annotation Depending on the preferences of the central bank, countries in a monetary union tend to accumulate less debt. This reduces the need for fiscal criteria such as debt ceilings. In a monetary union with an independent central bank and a sufficiently large number of relatively small members, investors will begin rationing credit to the government more rapidly, and an equilibrium with no inflation and no default exists. However, highly-indebted countries are more likely to default once they join a monetary union.
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| Other form: | Print version: Jahjah, Samir. Inflation, debt, and default in a monetary union. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, ©2000
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