Inflation, debt, and default in a monetary union /

Inflation, debt, and default in a monetary union /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Jahjah, Samir.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, ©2000.
Description:	1 online resource (29 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/00/179 IMF working paper ; WP/00/179.
Subject:	Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Debt -- Econometric models. Default (Finance) -- Econometric models. Monetary unions -- Econometric models. Equilibrium (Economics) -- Econometric models. Debt -- Econometric models. Default (Finance) -- Econometric models. Equilibrium (Economics) -- Econometric models. Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Monetary unions -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496556

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. IMF Institute.
ISBN:	1462350860 9781462350865 1452799628 9781452799629 1282108387 9781282108387 9786613801739 6613801739 9781451904383 145190438X
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-29). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	Annotation Depending on the preferences of the central bank, countries in a monetary union tend to accumulate less debt. This reduces the need for fiscal criteria such as debt ceilings. In a monetary union with an independent central bank and a sufficiently large number of relatively small members, investors will begin rationing credit to the government more rapidly, and an equilibrium with no inflation and no default exists. However, highly-indebted countries are more likely to default once they join a monetary union.
Other form:	Print version: Jahjah, Samir. Inflation, debt, and default in a monetary union. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, ©2000

Description
Summary:	Depending on the preferences of the central bank, countries in a monetary union tend to accumulate less debt. This reduces the need for fiscal criteria such as debt ceilings. In a monetary union with an independent central bank and a sufficiently large number of relatively small members, investors will begin rationing credit to the government more rapidly, and an equilibrium with no inflation and no default exists. However, highly-indebted countries are more likely to default once they join a monetary union.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (29 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-29).
ISBN:	1462350860 9781462350865 1452799628 9781452799629 1282108387 9781282108387 9786613801739 6613801739 9781451904383 145190438X