Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Dabla-Norris, Era, author.
International Monetary Fund, issuing body.
IMF Institute.
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| ISBN: | 1282049720
9781282049727
9781451905984
145190598X
1462307469
9781462307463
145199544X
9781451995442
9786613798022
6613798029
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-28).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | This paper examines the relationship between rent seeking and economic performance when governments cannot enforce property rights. With imperfect credit markets and a fixed cost of rent seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in it, since it enables them to protect their wealth from expropriation. Hence, the level of rent seeking and economic performance are determined by the initial distribution of income and wealth. When individuals also differ in their productivity, not all wealthy agents become rent seekers and the social costs of rent seeking are typically lower. In both cases, multiple equilibria with different levels of rent seeking and production are possible.
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| Other form: | Print version: Chakraborty, Shankha. Rent seeking. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2005
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451905984.001
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