Rent seeking /

Rent seeking /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Chakraborty, Shankha, author.
Imprint:	Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2005.
Description:	1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/05/43 IMF working paper ; WP/05/43.
Subject:	Rent (Economic theory) -- Econometric models. Income distribution -- Econometric models. Income distribution -- Econometric models. Rent (Economic theory) -- Econometric models. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496711

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Dabla-Norris, Era, author. International Monetary Fund, issuing body. IMF Institute.
ISBN:	1282049720 9781282049727 9781451905984 145190598X 1462307469 9781462307463 145199544X 9781451995442 9786613798022 6613798029
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-28). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	This paper examines the relationship between rent seeking and economic performance when governments cannot enforce property rights. With imperfect credit markets and a fixed cost of rent seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in it, since it enables them to protect their wealth from expropriation. Hence, the level of rent seeking and economic performance are determined by the initial distribution of income and wealth. When individuals also differ in their productivity, not all wealthy agents become rent seekers and the social costs of rent seeking are typically lower. In both cases, multiple equilibria with different levels of rent seeking and production are possible.
Other form:	Print version: Chakraborty, Shankha. Rent seeking. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2005
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451905984.001

Description
Summary:	This paper examines the relationship between rent seeking and economic performance when governments cannot enforce property rights. With imperfect credit markets and a fixed cost of rent seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in it, since it enables them to protect their wealth from expropriation. Hence, the level of rent seeking and economic performance are determined by the initial distribution of income and wealth. When individuals also differ in their productivity, not all wealthy agents become rent seekers and the social costs of rent seeking are typically lower. In both cases, multiple equilibria with different levels of rent seeking and production are possible.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-28).
ISBN:	1282049720 9781282049727 9781451905984 145190598X 1462307469 9781462307463 145199544X 9781451995442 9786613798022 6613798029
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;