Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. African Department.
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| ISBN: | 1451903987
9781451903980
1282107003
9781282107007
1462388205
9781462388202
1452730016
9781452730011
9786613800350
661380035X
9781451858686
145185868X
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 20-21).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | The extensive-and conceptually strikingly heterogenous-politico-economic literature (surveyed, e.g., by Frey, 1974; Alesina and Tabellini, 1988; Persson, 1988; Schneider, 1992; and Olters, 2000) is unified by the underlying premise that political decisions, in the absence of linguistic, religious, or ethnic divisions,2 are essentially economic ones. However, whereas elections-often to a considerable degree-influence the fiscal policies pursued by governments installed on the basis of their results, government behavior is typically modeled exogenously, usually by means of a benevolent, permanently installed "social planner
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| Other form: | Print version: Olters, Jan-Peter. Voting on the "optimal" size of government. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, African Dept., ©2000
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