Bank bailouts : moral hazard vs. value effect /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Cordella, Tito.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, ©1999.
Description:1 online resource (30 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/99/106
IMF working paper ; WP/99/106.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497394
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Other authors / contributors:Levy Yeyati, Eduardo.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department.
ISBN:1451898533
9781451898538
128134575X
9781281345752
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 29-30).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing "value effect" that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy
Other form:Print version: Cordella, Tito. Bank bailouts. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, ©1999