Central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions /

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Castellani, Francesca.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001.
Description:	1 online resource (37 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/01/205 IMF working paper ; WP/01/205.
Subject:	Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models. Monetary policy -- Econometric models. Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Fiscal policy -- Econometric models. Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models. Fiscal policy -- Econometric models. Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Monetary policy -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497395

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Debrun, Xavier. International Monetary Fund. IMF Institute.
ISBN:	1283515040 9781283515047 1451919131 9781451919134 1462393055 9781462393053 1452744998 9781452744995 9786613827494 6613827495
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-28). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central.
Other form:	Print version: Castellani, Francesca. Central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451919134.001

Similar Items