Central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Castellani, Francesca.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001.
Description:1 online resource (37 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/01/205
IMF working paper ; WP/01/205.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497395
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Debrun, Xavier.
International Monetary Fund.
IMF Institute.
ISBN:1283515040
9781283515047
1451919131
9781451919134
1462393055
9781462393053
1452744998
9781452744995
9786613827494
6613827495
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-28).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central.
Other form:Print version: Castellani, Francesca. Central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451919134.001

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