Monetary union in West Africa : who might gain, who might lose, and why? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Debrun, Xavier.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002.
Description:1 online resource (35 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/02/226
IMF working paper ; WP/02/226.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497442
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Other authors / contributors:Masson, Paul R.
Pattillo, Catherine A. (Catherine Anne)
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:1283513684
9781283513685
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 33-35).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
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Print version record.
Summary:We develop a multicountry model in which governments aim at excessive spending in order to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. This puts pressure on the monetary authorities to extract seigniorage, and thus affects the incentives countries would have to participate in a monetary union. This feature, ignored by the monetary union literature for Europe, is potentially important in Africa. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. We conclude that monetary union with Nigeria would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries, unless it were accompanied by effective discipline over Nigeria's fiscal policies.
Other form:Print version: Debrun, Xavier. Monetary union in West Africa. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002