Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
|
|---|
| ISBN: | 1451898010
9781451898019
1281372161
9781281372161
9781451852301
1451852304
|
|---|
| ISSN: | 2227-8885
|
|---|
| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-21).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
|
|---|
| Summary: | Several papers argue that debt crises can be the result of self-fulfilling expectations that no one will lend to a country. I show this type of coordination failure can be eliminated by a combination of state-contingent securities and a mechanism that allows investors to promise to lend only if enough other investors do so as well. This suggests that runs on the debt of a single borrower (such as the government) can be eliminated, and that self-fulfilling features are more plausible when articulated in a context in which externalities among many decentralized borrowers allow for economy-wide debt runs to occur.
|
|---|
| Other form: | Print version: Chamon, Marcos. Can debt crises be self-fulfilling? [Washington D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004
|
|---|
| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451898019.001
|
|---|
