Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN: | 1455259497
9781455259496
1462376177
9781462376179
1455268682
9781455268689
1281601349
9781281601346
9786613782038
6613782033
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-37).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | This paper examines the question of how to design an optimal and sustainable exchange rate regime in a world economy of two interdependent countries. It develops a Barro-Gordon type two-country model and compares noncooperative equilibria under different assumptions of monetary policy credibility and different exchange rate regimes. Using a two-stage game approach to the strategic choice of policy instruments, it identifies optimal (in a Pare to sense) and sustainable (self-enforcing) exchange rate regimes. the theoretical results indicate that the choice of such regimes depends fundamentally on the credibility of monetary policy commitments by the two countries authorities. the nature of shocks to the economies and the substitutability between goods produced in the two countries also play some role. International coordination on instrument choice is necessary to design optimal and sustainable exchange rate regimes.
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| Other form: | Print version: Kawai, Masahiro, 1947- Optimal and sustainable exchange rate regimes. [Washington, D.C.?] : International Monetary Fund, ©1992
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