What transparency can do when incentives fail : an analysis of rent capture /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Dabla-Norris, Era, author.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., ©2006.
Description:1 online resource (33 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/06/146
IMF working paper ; WP/06/146.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498554
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Other authors / contributors:Paul, Elisabeth, author.
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department.
ISBN:1282474251
9781282474253
9781451864069
145186406X
9781452702414
1452702411
Digital file characteristics:text file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
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Print version record.
Summary:This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes.
Other form:Print version: Dabla-Norris, Era. What transparency can do when incentives fail. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., ©2006