Regulatory capture in banking /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Hardy, Daniel C. L., author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept., ©2006.
Description:	1 online resource (23 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/06/34 IMF working paper ; WP/06/34.
Subject:	Banks and banking -- State supervision. Financial institutions -- State supervision. Banks and banking -- State supervision. Financial institutions -- State supervision.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498781

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Financial Systems Department.
ISBN:	1283516659 9781283516655 9781451908305 145190830X
Digital file characteristics:	text file
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-23). Print version record.
Summary:	Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions

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