Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN: | 1283553449
9781283553445
9781462387977
1462387977
9781462313327
1462313329
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| Notes: | At head of title: Fiscal Affairs Department.
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed September 9, 2011).
"July 2011."
Includes bibliographical references.
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| Summary: | Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on "fiscal councils" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing "commitment technologies" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline.
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| Other form: | Print version: Debrun, Xavier. Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies. Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2011 9781462313327
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