Democratic accountability, deficit bias, and independent fiscal agencies /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Debrun, Xavier, author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2011.
Description:	1 online resource (16 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/11/173 IMF working paper ; WP/11/173.
Subject:	Fiscal policy -- Political aspects -- Econometric models. Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models. Budget deficits -- Econometric models. Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models. Budget deficits -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12499403

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
ISBN:	1283553449 9781283553445 9781462387977 1462387977 9781462313327 1462313329
Notes:	At head of title: Fiscal Affairs Department. Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed September 9, 2011). "July 2011." Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:	Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on "fiscal councils" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing "commitment technologies" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline.
Other form:	Print version: Debrun, Xavier. Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies. Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2011 9781462313327

Table of Contents:

Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. An Illustrative Model of Fiscal Policy; A. Objectives and Constraints; B. Benchmark Equilibria; III. Institutional Solutions to the Deficit Bias: the Central Bank Analogy; A. From Central Bank Independence; B. ... to Independent Fiscal Institutions; C. Conclusion and Moving Forward; IV. Democratic Accountability and Independent Agencies; V. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes.

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