Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Dabán Sánchez, Teresa, author.
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| ISBN: | 1589062167
9781589062160
1452750017
9781452750019
9781452750019
1462355234
9781462355235
1452747970
9781452747972
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (page 522).
Online resource; title from PDF title page (IMF, viewed September 11, 2015).
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| Summary: | Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.
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| Other form: | Print version: Rules-based fiscal policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2003
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781452750019.084
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